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Abstract
In The Practice of Everyday Life, de Certeau likens himself to a Solar Eye reading the city spread 
out like a text below. He compares this all-seeing position to the enmeshed position of those 
whose intermingled footsteps pass through the city streets, writing stories that deliberately elude 
legibility. These two ways of experiencing the city offer a theoretical frame through which I will 
explore both the administration of protest spaces, and protesters’ ongoing attempts to subvert 
and evade those controls. In doing so, this contribution will examine the way in which the police 
practice of kettling depends upon the police’s ability to draw a series of distinctions between 
‘good’ protesters who comply with state demands, and ‘bad’ protesters who err from official 
routes.  It will go onto to explore the way in which the practice of maptivism impacts upon 
protesters’ ability to occupy city spaces and resist the totalising administrations of the state.
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Public demonstrations move people and their ideas from the margins to the mainstream. Thus, when protesters converge on sites of national or global significance, such as St Paul’s 
Cathedral in London, the Zócalo in Mexico City or Tahrir Square in Cairo, they attempt to 
illustrate both their own lack of a place within the status quo and to offer alternative political 
positions to a wider public. Consequently, these city spaces become a site of both physical and 
ideological struggle, between those ‘legitimising what is already known’ (Foucault cited in Patton, 
2000: 25) and those trying to offer the mainstream ‘a glimpse of what is possible…a utopia 
defined not as a no-place but as this-place’ (Notes From Nowhere Collective, 2003: 182). 
In The Practice of Everyday Life, de Certeau describes the act of ‘physically moving about’ the 
city as having the itinerant function of yesterday’s or today’s superstitions’ (1984: 106). This 
understanding of protest as an expression of placelessness can be further developed by turning to 
Mary Douglas’ work Purity and Danger. In this book she argues that the arrival of marginal groups 
into collective or community spaces disrupts pre-existing orders. She goes on to suggest that 
such external threats require a particular set of cleansing responses from ‘persons representing 
the formal structure’ (2002: 1060). This is a role that in mature western democracies is fulfilled by 
the police, who are charged with the maintenance of social, and therefore by implication political, 
order (Reiner, 2000: 8).
This article will offer an alternative reading of the dynamic between more traditional 
activists who are willing to engage with the police and autonomous activists who are not. It will 
begin by drawing on de Certeau and exploring the different ways in which mass demonstrations 
can be read. It will go on to examine the way in which the police practice of kettling acts as a 
‘filtering mechanism’ (Douglas, 2002: 38) that produces a series of distinctions between ‘good’ 
protesters who comply with state demands, and ‘bad’ protesters who err from official routes. 
Finally, it will explore the ways in which the practice of maptivism redresses the imbalance of 
informational power between protesters and police, and asks whether such web applications 
currently contribute to the ability of protesters to resist the totalising administrations of the state. 
Reading Mass Demonstrations
I’d like to begin by recalling De Certeau standing at the top of the World Trade Centre 
gazing down on Manhattan spread out below. According to de Certeau, the city seen from above 
‘provides a way of conceiving and constructing space on the basis of a finite number of stable, 
isolatable and interconnected properties’ (1984: 94). In other words, it imposes order upon the 
‘ordinary practitioners’ who live ‘below the thresholds at which visibility begins’ (1984: 93). 
Consequently, he likens himself to Icarus and describes the way in which the doomed boy’s flight 
turned him into an all-seeing, all-knowing ‘solar Eye’ and writes:  
His elevation transfigures him into a voyeur; it puts him at a distance. It transforms the 
bewitching world by which one was ‘possessed’ into a text that lies before one’s eyes. It 
allows one to read it, to be a solar eye looking down like a God. (1984: 92)  
De Certeau argues that this elevated position enables him to read the city as if it were 
a text. However, he points out that this understanding of the city is ultimately a pleasurable 
‘misunderstanding’ (1984: 93). He suggests that by relinquishing the privileges offered by the 
solar eye and ‘stepping in through proportions, sequences, and intensities which vary according 
to the time, the path taken and the walker’ (2004: 99) one can immerse oneself within a 
differently experienced city space. This requires one to adopt a far more uncomfortable in-the-
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middle position, which entangles and enmeshes the walker within the ‘murky intertwining daily 
behaviours’ of the proliferating inhabitants below (1984: 93). He goes on to suggest that their 
entangled routes through the urban landscape constitutes an ‘unrecognised poem in which each 
body is an element signed by many others’ but which eludes legibility (de Certeau, 1984: 93).
This topological view is further developed by the parallel between traversing textual space 
and actual space. De Certeau asserts that the ‘act of walking is to the urban city what the speech 
act is to language’ (1998: 97). In this way he makes a connection between seeing and reading, 
walking and writing. De Certeau’s approach has been developed into the notion of third space. 
In his influential article, Soja describes third space as an ‘open ended set of defining moments’ 
(1996: 260), a space that is ‘creatively open to redefinition and expansion in new directions’ (1996: 
2). Routledge extends the notion by reflecting on the overlapping intersections in third space 
and upon the ‘coming and going in a borderline zone between different modes of action’ (1996: 
406). These are spaces in which a ‘unity of experience’ (Douglas, 2002: 4) has been purposefully 
relinquished in favour of the potential inherent in disordered transitional states.
I would suggest that the notion of the city as a text read from above, but written from within, 
offers a particularly helpful way of thinking about how we experience the construction of protest. 
I begin by examining demonstrations that are represented as peaceful and legitimate occupations 
of city spaces. Traditional demonstrations, such as those now organised by institutionalised protest 
organisations are invariably headed by a movement’s most vocal and recognisable members. 
These leaders usually carry a large banner, which articulates activists’ principal demands and 
titles the demonstration. This provides onlookers with a politically clear and unambiguous focal 
point. This group is usually followed by a large number of more anonymous protesters who are 
frequently broken up into smaller sub-sections or ‘chapters’ by banners proclaiming membership 
of a particular group or organisation. These sub-sections tend to mirror the hierarchies of the 
demonstration as a whole. Thus they are headed by the most committed local activists who are 
then followed by less active core supporters. This leaves a non-affiliated mass of individuals to 
demonstrate popular support, wave placards and generally bring up the rear.
One could argue that traditionally organised demonstrations are remarkably print-based. 
They spread out before the viewer and, like the city seen from above, can be read like printed 
texts. They have a linear narrative, which has been carefully credited, titled and broken up into 
more or less discrete and manageable chapters. Like a newspaper, their intent can be grasped 
by scanning the banners/headlines that lead the columns of marchers/print. Political ends are 
articulated via banners, placards and flyers that spell out the protesters’ demands. This emphasis 
on text has important political implications. Ong points out that the ‘mindset’ characteristic of 
print culture creates a sense of personal disengagement from ‘the arena where human beings 
struggle with one and other’ (Ong, 1982: 43). If one applies Ong’s notion of a print mindset to 
the march, then activists taking part in traditionally organised demonstrations cannot ‘actualise’ 
their own route through the ‘constructed order’ (de Certeau, 1984: 93). Instead, activists are 
required/permitted to do little more than walk the pre-arranged route, echo the pre-chosen 
chants and listen to the prepared speeches. 
Similarly an individual watching the demonstration pass by (who is, let’s not forget, a 
potential activist) is placed in a removed and excluded position. Like de Certeau on top of the 
World Trade Centre they read a coherent and pleasing, but in many ways ‘fictional’, account 
of the political terrain spread out before them (de Certeau, 1984: 93). In smoothing out the 
contradictory uncertainties of most protest movements, these sorts of demonstrations offer a 
‘semblance of order’ (Douglas, 2002: 4) that can be misleading. This is a view which stills the 
‘opaque mobility’ of the city/text, creating a sense of god-like euphoria, but it is also, as Icarus 
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discovered, both temporary and misguided. In this way, both the marchers and the observers 
occupy a politically distanced and potentially mistaken position in relation to traditionally 
organised mass demonstrations. 
The structural systems of traditionally organised demonstrations seem to encourage, even 
require, activists to be the passive element in the producer/consumer binary. For many activists 
this sense of closure has depressing political implications in that it removes the individual from 
the everyday struggles of the life-world, making politics appear both alien (it’s nothing to do 
with me) and unalterable (I can’t do anything about it anyway). As a result, many autonomous 
protesters argue that traditional demonstrations are ‘essentially’ a form of ‘lobbying en masse’ 
(Black block protesters, no date). These debates began to circulate through activist circles in the 
build up to the very large-scale summit demonstrations that characterised the early days of the 
anti-globalisation movement and are still shaping autonomous protest today (Ruiz, 2014). 
The police are keen to facilitate mass demonstrations in an attempt to maintain a reputation 
as fair and even-handed managers of legitimate protest. Waddington argues that this had led 
to protest becoming increasingly institutionalised in such a way as to severely limit the impact 
protesters can make upon the mainstream’s political consciousness (1998). Thus, for example, the 
route of many marches takes protesters away from the most populated areas of a city. Similarly, city 
centre marches tend to be scheduled in such a way as to avoid peak periods in the day such as rush 
hour. Consequently, one could argue that by utilising the quietest roads and hours, traditionally 
organised demonstrations purposefully keep protesters out of the public eye, ensuring that the 
articulation of dissent does not disrupt the patterns and rhythms of everyday city life. This lends 
credibility to autonomous activists’ belief that protest is permitted, sometimes even encouraged, 
but only on the proviso that it does not actually impact on the day to day workings of city life 
(Reiner, 1998: 47).  
Protesters’ sense of being, at best, managed within and, at worst, excluded from, mainstream 
public arenas (Gitlin, 2003, Holleran et al, 1970) has led autonomous activists to challenge many 
of the structures that shape public demonstrations. While such organisations are obliged by law1 
to inform the police of their intent to demonstrate, autonomous activists usually refuse to enter 
into any of the usual pre-demonstration collaborations. They justify this position by claiming 
that their rejection of hierarchies and bureaucracies render them organisationally incapable of 
engaging with the police as they do not have leaders/spokespersons/liaison officers to conduct 
negotiations on the behalf of the wider collective (unnamed protester, J18, 1999). 
This refusal to negotiate with the police has a significant impact on the way in which 
autonomous protests produce themselves on the ground. As previously discussed, conventionally 
organised demonstrations offer onlookers a solar eye view of an unfolding, but predetermined, 
political narrative. Autonomously organised demonstrations, on the other hand, refuse to rank 
or prioritise the political positions available to individual protesters. Consequently, the familiar 
givens of a traditionally organised march are replaced by a sprawling ebb and flow of protest 
clusters, which emerge and dissolve, repeatedly and at random, throughout the day and across 
the city. This creates a demonstrative space in which participants, spectators and the police are 
all immersed in the murky in-between spaces of political struggle. 
These demonstrative third spaces deny protesters the sense of security and direction offered 
by traditional political organisations. They exist at ‘ground level’ and are composed by a myriad of 
‘footsteps’ that ‘cannot be counted because each unit has a qualitative character: a style of tactile 
apprehension and kinaesthetic appropriation (De Certeau, 1984: 97). They are constituted by the 
1    According to British law activists must ‘notify’ police of their intent to demonstrate at least six days prior to the 
proposed event. 
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unexpected and potentially transformative ways in which different types of people combine with 
differently constructed places. In this way they require individual protesters to produce their 
own political position, via the links and connections they make with the people/materials around 
them (Moles, 2008). Thus, rather than consuming the city from above, autonomous protesters 
weave through the city streets creating the ‘thicks and thins of an urban ‘text’ they write without 
being able to read’ (de Certeau, 1984: 93). 
Equally significantly, this type of space refuses to be read easily and requires observers – 
passers by, the police and journalists - to actively participate in the construction of meaning. Thus, 
while traditionally organised demonstrations lead the reader along a predetermined route through 
the city, autonomous demonstrations’ refusal to offer a preferred route deliberately deprives 
the observer of an enticing (albeit fictional) understanding of the demonstration. Instead, it 
requires them to engage in the effort of producing their own partial but embedded reading of the 
demonstration and the context within which it exists. Consequently, while these demonstrations 
are inevitably structured by a wider societal power dynamic, they are also polysemic and open to 
multiple interpretations (Hall, 1974).
In summary, traditionally organised demonstrations are characterised by an ordered and 
segmented flow, which allows them to coincide with the equally administered city spaces 
that surround them. In contrast, autonomous protesters’ rejection of hierarchical top-down 
organisational structures in favour of more flexible, horizontal communication systems, creates 
demonstrative spaces which are in a perpetual state of flux. This produces a dynamic in which 
the city streets can be represented as a site of contest between differently organised protest 
groupings, such as those committed to non-violent direct action and those who advocate more 
confrontational forms of civil disobedience, as well as between protesters and police.
Polly put the kettle on…
The ‘gleeful delight’ taken by autonomous protesters in the wilful ‘scrambling of conventional 
categories’ (Graeber, 2004: 209) is problematic for those charged with the maintenance of public 
order. Autonomous protesters’ refusal to enter into pre-demonstration negotiations with the 
police has the effect of removing the temporal and spatial boundaries that usually constrain 
the articulation of public dissent. Moreover, the loss of orientation experienced by individuals 
and organisations accustomed to occupying a comfortable (but mistaken) solar eye position 
can trigger a reaction of panic. Consequently, the police, who are charged with maintaining 
order, tend to view such protests as ‘solely about bringing disruption and inconvenience to the 
city’ (Superintendent Kevin Moore cited in the Brighton and Hove Argus, 2005). Similarly, the 
mainstream media tends to frame autonomous demonstrations as constituting an incoherent, 
uncontrollable and therefore potentially dangerous threat to civil society (Donson, 2004, Stein, 
2001). 
The introduction of austerity measures in response to the financial crisis of 2008 has led to 
increased levels of civil unrest. These demonstrations are being policed at a time when there has 
been a significant decrease in the levels of funding allocated to the maintenance of public order. 
The police have responded to these challenging dynamics by relying increasingly heavily on the 
practice of kettling demonstrators who are refusing to actively participate in the administration of 
protest. Kettling is a tactic that has been used during both local and national demonstrations for a 
considerable number of years. The police describe kettling as ‘progressively isolating problematic 
groups and individuals from peaceful protesters’ (Policing Public Order, 2001: 7). ‘Problematic’ 
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groups are corralled and detained, often without access to shelter, food or water, until the police 
ascertain that the threat to law and order has been dissipated.  This tactic is perceived by activists 
and some human rights organisations as a ‘brutal and undemocratic’ attempt to repress citizens’ 
right to protest (http://www.opensukey.org).
Kettling can be read as the moment in which the systems and structure of autonomous 
protesters clash with those imposed by the police and other state powers. As such, it is worth 
examining the processes that constitute a kettle in a little more detail. Kettling employs three 
interrelated policing techniques.  Firstly, the police form into lines, often but not always at a 
crossroads or junction, which they draw up and around a moving demonstration. This has the 
effect of capturing, confining and then compressing protesters within an ever-decreasing space. 
Each of the police lines tends to be two officers thick and is supported by a number of police 
vans and other vehicles. In this way, leaderless marches, which had been loosely disorganised, are 
corralled and controlled by the imposition of a solid and intimidating police boundary. 
Having imposed these boundaries on the demonstration, the police create an unbridgeable 
gap between the spaces inside and outside the cordoned-off area. Protesters who attempt to 
breach the cordon in order to talk to passers-by or hand out leaflets are prevented from doing so 
and pushed back into the space allocated to them. In addition, members of the public who try 
to remonstrate with the police on behalf of trapped protesters are physically escorted from the 
scene. In this way, the police impose a space of about five to ten feet between ‘protesters’ and 
‘the public’, making the two groupings separated and discreet. Mingling between these different 
groups is disallowed. 
Finally, having imposed a distinction between protesters and the public, the police frequently 
impose a further distinction between ‘good’ protesters and ‘bad’ protesters2. They do this by 
appealing to different categories of people to leave the space they have enclosed. So, for example, 
the police will often offer to escort the elderly or less able, as well as people with small children, 
beyond the police lines and into ‘safe’ public space. The removal of ‘good’ or ‘ordinary’ protesters 
alters the demographic dynamic of the demonstration considerably. It creates a homogenised 
space occupied only by protesters physically and emotionally strong enough to withstand the 
escalating tensions. Thus a space that had been creatively open to redefinition and expansion is 
re-categorised as a potentially contaminating threat to wider society and closed down.
The imposition of such clearly demarcated boundaries eradicates the possibility of an 
overlapping in-the-middle position and ensures that there can be no potentially contaminating 
intermingling across the previously porous boundary. The borderline zone between different 
modes of action identified by Routledge is simply eradicated. Consequently, the possibility of being 
a protester and a member of the public during an autonomous demonstration is disallowed. In 
this way the police can be seen to be re-ordering the city in a way which is inherently conservative 
in so far as it assumes that ‘a stratified society is the proper natural outcome of human history as 
well as the underpinning of political life’ (Amartrudo, 2009: 50). 
This technique is particularly significant because, as Waddington (1998: 55) points out, 
‘patrolling the boundary of inclusion and exclusion’ involves bestowing (and withholding) 
citizenship on the people. In doing so they guard against the dangers inherent in transitional 
states by creating a ritual which ‘separates’ the protester ‘from his old status, segregates him for 
2    The police force’s increased reliance on kettling as a tool for maintaining public order means that variations on this 
practice are beginning to appear. For example, the kettle imposed upon students during the protests against tuition fees 
in London was so large that those in the middle of the protest were often unaware that they were being detained. On 
the other hand the police arrested every single one of the 286 demonstrators who had been kettled after breaking away 
from a Unite Against Fascism protest in 2013. 
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a time and then publically declares his entry into a new status’ (Douglas, 202: 97), the police are 
protecting pre-existing patterns of society and ensuring that protesters confirm to an ‘ideal order’ 
(Douglas, 2002: 2). Thus, the police practice of kettling is a ‘filtering mechanism’ that produces 
a particular type of protest space; one that ‘forces’ protesters into ‘good and bad’ and justifies the 
forceful imposition of ‘order’ on those who remain. 
The distinction between protesters and public drawn by the police on the street is reproduced 
by journalists in the news. As Juras points out, the ‘rebel styles, imagery and tactics’ of this 
protest demographic have a tendency to lend themselves to dominant media frames that would 
construct protesters as ‘deviant’ (2005: 423).  The police practice of kettling facilitates this type 
of coverage of popular demonstrations as it almost inevitably focuses the media’s attention on the 
young and increasingly angry. Consequently, these protesters are particularly vulnerable to being 
delegitimized in the news, as well as on the streets, as an aggressive, antagonistic and borderline 
criminal ‘them’ whose occupation of shared material and symbolic spaces constitutes a real and 
present threat to the identity of the law abiding ‘us’ (Mouffe, 2005). 
Despite anti-globalisation protesters’ attempts to challenge the practice of kettling in the 
European Court of Human Rights in 2001, debates around the police practice of containment 
generally failed to gain traction within wider public arenas. However, the classification of 
demonstrating secondary school children in 2009 (some of whom were as young as eleven) as 
‘problematic’, and their subsequent containment without access to food and water for more than 
six hours, was widely read as an example of ‘indiscriminate punishment’ (Bowcott, 2011). As a 
result, the police found themselves in a position where the tactic of kettling or containment was 
being retrospectively redefined by a wider public as potentially problematic (Waddington, 1998). 
 A small group of students from University College London responded to these events by 
developing an anti-kettling app called Sukey3. These students had been ‘recently politicised’ 
(Kingsley, 2011) by the violence they experienced during student demonstrations against the 
coalition government’s introduction of tuition fees. They described Sukey as a ‘multi platform 
news, communication and logistical support system’ (http://opensukey.org), which combines 
information from Twitter, Facebook, SMS and RSS, to give real time information about the 
movements of both protesters and the police during demonstrations. Some critics in the 
mainstream described the website in very negative terms. For example, Tory blogger Harry Cole 
called Sukey a tool for rioters, tweeting ‘there something disgustingly ironic about riot organising 
iphone app. Just about says it all about this countries kids.’ (sic, cited in Kingsley, 2011). However, 
these views were quickly modified when it became clear that Sukey’s imagined audience would 
be using the web app to avoid, rather than provoke, confrontation.  
The Sukey team describe their aim as being:
[...] to provide peaceful protesters with up to date news that will keep them informed, 
assist them in avoiding injury, help them keep clear of trouble spots and avoid unnecessary 
injury. (Sukey, 2011)
Sukey sets out to achieve this aim by gathering information from multiple sources as a 
demonstration unfolds on the ground. Information is crowd-sourced from members of the public 
embedded in the demonstration, and other non-protesting but interested parties such as parents, 
the police and journalists. Once data has been gathered in this way, it is verified by members of 
3    Sukey’s name is taken from the well-known children’s rhyme ‘Polly put the kettle on’, which ends with the lines 
‘Sukey take it off again/we all go home’.
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the Sukey team, condensed and plotted onto a map which is fed back out to protesters on the 
street via smartphones. Protesters on the ground can use Sukey in one of two ways. They can 
use it to either access a map that plots the movements of protesters and the police in real time or 
they can use it to access a compass4 which points to safe or hazardous protest zones. In this way 
Sukey enables protesters to avoid getting caught up in police kettles and other points of conflict. 
The Sukey website enables people who do not know each other to act in concert because 
they ‘carry devices that possess both communication and computing capabilities’ (Rheingold, 
2000: 191). Moreover, in doing so it creates an interlinked network of strong and weak ties 
(Latour, 1999, McAdam, 1999) which redresses the imbalance of information between police and 
protesters, and allows protesters5 to actively participate in the construction of the demonstration 
they constitute on the ground whilst also being able to ‘see what’s going on around them’ (http://
beyondclicktivism.com) from above. As such, protesters with access to Sukey occupy both an 
enmeshed, in-the-middle position ‘below the threshold at which visibility begins’ and an elevated, 
all-seeing ‘solar eye’ position (de Certeau, 1984: 92). 
These types of information networks are particularly significant when one compares them 
to the far more rigid and inflexible communications structures utilised by the police force. While 
the police enjoy access to a communications network that includes aerial surveillance units, 
closed-circuit television cameras and forward intelligence teams, their communications systems 
remain distinctly hierarchical and organisationally bound (HMIC, 2011). The police force’s 
communication networks allows commanders to communicate clearly with police officers on the 
ground but does not facilitate horizontal communication between different police officers on the 
streets or the wider public. Thus, while the police enjoy a solar eye view of a demonstration, they 
are far removed from the communicative ebb and flow experienced by those walking through 
the city streets.
Sukey appears to be part of the empowering groundswell of technology-driven tools, which 
have transformed the nature of protest (for example, blogger Dominic Fox describes Sukey as 
‘a kind of emblem of organization, a statement of intent’ (2011). This understanding of new 
information technologies in general, and social networking in particular, underpins many 
popular debates around events such as the Arab Spring (Rheingold, 2000). Such technologically 
deterministic narratives suggest that the affordances of new communications systems are the 
salvation, or alternatively the ruin, of our otherwise ailing democratic process. This analysis 
recognizes the organisational potential of digital communication (Bennett and Segerberger, 
2012) and appears to substantiate the more abstract accounts of networked power put forward by 
scholars such as Castells (2007) and Benkler (2006).
These narrative frames have much in common with those used to frame activists’ use of the 
Internet in the late 1990’s. Indymedia, for example, was seen by many as the power behind the anti-
globalisation movement which was itself described as 'web-like’ (Viner, 2000). Both Indymedia 
and Sukey emerged in response to a protest environment shaped by a particular moment in the 
unfolding dynamics of neo-liberal globalisation. In both cases, connections were made between 
technological affordances offered by new technologies and an implied ‘interior transformation of 
consciousness’ (Ong, 1982: 82) that challenges top down communication flows. However, Sukey 
is different from Indymedia in a number of significant ways. 
Indymedia perceives itself to be the teller of ‘radical, accurate and passionate’ truths (http://
4    The compass application took longer than anticipated to code and was therefore not initially available to protesters. 
5    It’s worth noting that some protesters do not have access to smartphones and that other more surveillance savvy 
protesters may choose to leave their mobile phones at home during demonstrations.
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www.indymedia.org) that, they argue, are purposefully ignored by corporate media providers. In 
doing so, Indymedia recognises the ways in which information flows are structured by the wider 
political economy and therefore contribute to a particular understanding of the world. It aims 
to offer an explicitly alternative understanding of the news and attempts to instigate change by 
circumventing the traditional editorial structures of the mainstream. The spaces on Indymedia 
are consequently open and less structured and as a result, Indymedia is open to a multiplicity of 
alternative and sometimes conflicting perspectives that constantly re-articulate various us/them 
distinctions (Ruiz, 2014).  
In comparison, Sukey has a far less passionate, more distanced understanding of truth. Rather 
than recognising the contest between competing narratives that construct our understanding 
of events, Sukey focuses its energies on creating an information flow capable of channelling 
previously unavailable information into a shared narrative. In this way, Sukey aims to deliver 
information to members of the demonstrating public that will enable them to  ‘make sensible 
informed decisions’ about the ways in which they engage with the legal limits previously specified 
by the police (http://www.opensukey.org). This is not to say that Sukey is uninterested in 
redressing the imbalance of information between protesters and police, but to point out that they 
do so by increasing the range of narrative flows rather than by directly challenging pre-existing 
narratives.  
Sukey places great emphasis on the ways in which information is gathered, condensed and 
verified before being released back out on to the street: 
When you see something interesting, you tell us. When we’re confident that  
something has actually happened we tell you’. (http://www.opensukey.org).
Whereas Indymedia sees the representation of events on the ground as something which is in 
part constructed and contested within the discursive realm, Sukey presents events as something 
that can, and should, be verified by external observers before entering the discursive realm. 
According to this view, events are something that have either happened or not happened and 
Sukey perceives its role to be that of determining in which of these two categories a particular 
piece of information should fall. Consequently, one could describe Sukey’s intervention as 
technological rather than ideological in its nature.
This conceptualization of information as true, verifiable and objective is an informational 
ethos, which Sukey team members acknowledge as having come straight from the mainstream 
newsroom: ‘We’re like a busy newsroom’, says Bernie, ‘we have to get information in, check 
it makes sense, and then get it back out’ (Kingsley, 2011). This ethos is built upon a liberal 
conception of the public sphere in which the media both inform the public, and constitute a 
neutral power-free zone in which to agree upon what constitutes the greater good (Habermas, 
1974). Sukey seeks to create a digital space in which protesters can share information and arrive at 
an informed collective consensus about the best ways in which to proceed. This strategy implies 
that balanced informational flows will provide users with a more complete understanding of 
events. In doing so, it backgrounds economic and social structural inequalities and effaces the 
power disparities between social actors. 
Such an understanding contrasts with conceptualisations of the public sphere which regard 
conflict as both an inevitable and a necessary part of the democratic process (Mouffe, 2005). 
Consequently, radical democratic approaches allow for a perpetually shifting and more complex 
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understanding of truth within the public sphere. Indymedia’s refusal to verify information 
means that its pages are characterized by far more agonistic (and sometimes antagonistic) 
clashes of opinion. In this way, we can see that even though Sukey occupies a digitalized 
space routinely characterized as being constituted by empowering horizontal flows, it is, in 
comparison to Indymedia, actually rather didactic and hierarchical in its technical composition 
and communicative tone.
…Sukey take it off again
Sukey has garnered a considerable amount of generally positive mainstream media coverage. 
Articles prompted by Sukey’s initial press release have appeared in The Economist, The Star and the 
New Scientist. A far longer article, drawing on a visit to the team’s ‘secret nerve centre’, appeared 
in The Guardian shortly after the demonstrations on January 29 (Kingsley, 2011). All these articles 
outlined Sukey’s basic aims and intentions and were cautiously optimistic about the opportunities 
offered by the new web application. 
The response from the alternative media was initially similarly positive, with supportive 
articles and blogs appearing on sites such as Indymedia UK and Beyond Clicktivism. Sukey was 
recognised to be a ‘nifty gadget’ (Fox, 2011) with the potential to change the ways in which 
protesters and the police engaged with each other during public demonstrations. However, a 
perceived reluctance to fully engage with alternative publics prompted a shift in activists’ 
responses to the web application. These doubts coalesced around Sukey’s willingness to engage 
with mainstream organisations in general and the police in particular. 
In February 2011 Sukey released a press statement entitled ‘Sukey comments on today’s 
HMIC report’, which addressed the way in which the police force was struggling to ‘cope with 
the increased volume and frequency of protest’ in the wake of proposed cuts to their budget. It 
offered to ‘step into that gap’ by ‘sharing information on planned kettles openly and honestly’ and 
included the following statement: 
Our work coincides entirely with the police goal of preserving public order, and the 
public’s concern of staying safe at protests. It goes without saying that  we are addressing 
concerns that we restrict criminals from exploiting it. (http://www.sukey.org)
This press release prompted a bitter and extended activist backlash, which made itself 
manifest through a flurry of frequently vitriolic outrage on Twitter and other social networking 
sites. The following month, minutes from a meeting between Sukey team members and the 
Metropolitan Police Service were leaked on Indymedia where they were described as ‘not 
irredeemably damming’ and ‘smacking more of naivety than genuine collusion’ (Riotact, 2011). 
The Sukey team’s willingness to engage with the police caused much consternation within 
the wider activist community. Many activists felt that Sukey had failed to understand the power 
dynamics between police and protesters within the public sphere and were highly critical of 
Sukey’s tendency to categorize police and protesters as equally powerful partners in dialogue. 
This point is best exemplified by an activist who described the police as a ‘massive conservative 
and powerful state institution which can legally use force and coercion’ and argued that Sukey’s 
emphasis on balance was failing to ‘whole-heartedly take sides with those who hold the least 
power’ (Random Blowe, 2011) 
Activists’ criticism quickly consolidated around three interwoven issues: Sukey’s refusal 
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to release the code behind the application to online activist communities; Sukey’s reliance on 
commercial platforms; and Sukey’s ongoing engagement with the police. These issues will now 
be discussed in such a way as to reveal the problematic assumptions which underpin Sukey’s 
perception of protest, its role within city spaces and within the wider public sphere.  
The first criticism was technological in its nature. While the Sukey team were prepared 
in principle to release the code to other protester organisations that had expressed an interest 
in replicating the application in different locations, they claimed that ‘usability issues’ (https://
london.indymedia.org.uk) prevented them from doing so. For example, the Sukey team 
maintained that the code would be ‘meaningless to most without a decent and easy to use front 
and back end’ (Gaus cited in Kinsley, 2011). When pushed, Sukey expressed its intent to release 
an annotated version of the code after the London demonstration ‘then start working on Sukey 2 
in a private fork’ on the grounds that this would ‘maximise both security and openness’6 (https://
london.indymedia.org.uk).  
However, activists from autonomous traditions are generally happy to throw ‘messy code 
out into the public domain’ and felt that this was an act of technological gatekeeping (Harrison, 
http://visionon.tv, 2011). At a pragmatic level, it was pointed out that refusing to release the code 
prevented Sukey from crowd-sourcing technical skills which would enable ‘holes to be found and 
fixed a lot faster’ (Harmon, http://visionon.tv, 2011). On a more strategic level, it was argued that 
releasing the code would enable other activists to develop the code rhizomatically in any direction 
and so contribute to ‘a diversity of strategies that is the building block of all successful social 
change projects’ (Campell, http://visionon.tv, 2010). The most critical commentators maintained 
that Sukey’s refusal to release the code stemmed from a desire to remain in ‘complete control’ in 
order to better ‘collaborate with the police’ (Harrison, http://visionon.tv, 2011).
The second criticism stems from the web application’s occupation of commercial rather than 
alternative online spaces. The speed and intensity of technological change means that activists 
are frequently faced with a choice between remaining loyal to alt-tech and accepting ‘the probably 
crippling effects of moving into a shadow world of limited usability/effectiveness’ (Campbell, 
http://visionon.tv, 2011) or interacting with corporate sites which function ‘on a scale and in a 
speed and with a user base that is huge compared to anything we ever did’ (Indymedia London 
network cited in Askanius and Gustafsson 2010: 36). In these circumstances protest organisations 
are increasingly ‘hopping the fence’ and moving into online spaces with greater technological 
affordances (Lodge, http://visionon.tv, 2011). 
As a result of these dynamics there has been a move from explicitly radical sites such 
as Indymedia and Alternet to online spaces that are owned and controlled by commercial 
organisations such as Facebook and Twitter. These changes in the media practices of activism 
create hybrid spaces that are characterised by ‘the coexistence of subversive politics and 
commodified private communications’ (Askanius and Gustafsson 2010: 23). Within such spaces, 
activists’ passionate critiques of neo-liberalism are often surrounded by banner ads promoting 
the consumption patterns that underpin the self-same dynamic. Thus, while activists may be 
radical in their individual intent, these spaces are often politically ambiguous.
Sukey’s uncertain position within these hybrid spaces is highlighted by its own use of 
language. Sukey rarely echoes the vocabulary and tone of the radical left. Instead, it tends to echo 
the consumption-orientated lexicon of the mainstream. For example, the Sukey team describe 
itself as a ‘free product’ (Sukey press release, 2011). Similarly, while Sukey distributes information 
about the movements of police and protesters, it also offers information about nearby amenities 
6    Sukey has as yet to release the code, although it has been working with activists from Visionon TV. Following a 
period of silence it recently tweeted about a forthcoming collaboration with ‘the most intuitive hackers/developers’. 
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such as coffee shops, public conveniences and payphones (Sukey press release, 2011). Indeed, at 
times, their tone verges on the corporate. For example, its aims and intentions are outlined in 
‘an executive statement’, where its ‘objectives’ and ‘Success Criteria’ are also carefully outlined 
(Indymedia, 2011). 
Criticisms from the wider activist community were less concerned with the potentially 
commodified status and tone of these spaces and more alarmed by the security implications 
raised by the use of mainstream media platforms. For many activists, particularly those engaged 
in more confrontational forms of direct action, this is, of course, deeply problematic. As recent 
revelations regarding the infiltration of protest groups by the Special Demonstration Squad 
illustrate, many activists’ lives are already far too heavily policed. This is a view expressed by 
the Indymedia activist Yossarian, who claims that occupying mainstream online spaces, such as 
Twitter and Facebook, is ‘like holding all your political meetings at McDonalds and ensuring that 
the police come and film while you do so’ (cited in Askanius and Gustafsson, 2010: 34). 
Despite these very real fears, the opportunities offered by mainstream service providers 
mean that activists simply cannot afford to ignore mainstream platforms such as Facebook or 
Twitter. Having decided to utilise mainstream platforms, Sukey took these issues seriously from 
the onset and ensured that all its data was ‘anonymised using secure encryption that is known 
to be unbreakable in less than ten years using current computer technology’ (spyblog.org.uk). 
Unfortunately, these unsubstantiated reassurances were given so late and so lightly that the web 
application’s ‘reputation and credibility’ (Gaus cited in Kingsley, 2011) within the wider activist 
community had already been severely compromised.
Sukey’s reluctance to release their coding, and their use of commercial platforms is indicative 
of the web application’s ambiguous position on the boundary that both separates and connects 
the margins from/to the mainstream. This brings us to the wider activist community’s third 
criticism of Sukey: its attitude to the mainstream in general and the police in particular. Sukey’s 
willingness to engage with journalists and the police signals a shift away from an alternative/
oppositional dichotomy outlined in relation to Indymedia and towards a less explicitly critical 
view of the mainstream. This understanding can be most clearly heard in one of Sukey’s responses 
to criticism from the wider activist community. It reads:
I think we have a different perception between our target audiences/readers … Sukey is 
about keeping peaceful protesters safe and informed and mobile. We’re not part of the 
anarchist toolkit – and nor do we want to be … Sukey is designed to be predominately 
mainstream. (http://visionon.tv) 
Thus, while Sukey may well be critical of specific governmental policies, it is not critical of the 
mainstream per se. Indeed Sukey perceives itself to be the mainstream.
This conceptualisation of protesters does not challenge or unsettle the distinctions 
commonly drawn between protesters and publics. Indead, Sukey simply relocates this boundary 
by redefining protesters as ‘not full time activists’ and re-conceiving them as ‘just normal people 
who want to go about their normal lives’. Thus, Sukey appears to elide the category of public 
and protester within the notion of the ‘predominantly mainstream’. However these normal, 
mainstream people are contrasted with ‘the crazies’ or ‘criminals’ (http://visionon.tv) who 
actively seek confrontation with the apparatuses of state. Consequently, one could argue that 
Sukey is simply reproducing the distinctions commonly imposed by the police on the ground and 
journalists in the papers between ‘good’ protesters and ‘bad’ protesters. 
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The distinction drawn by Sukey is particularly problematic in that it emerges from within a 
protest movement rather than being imposed upon a protest movement by external forces. Like 
an externalised solar eye, it stills the ‘opaque mobility’ of contemporary protest movements, 
smoothes out the contradictions and conflicts and offers the reader an apparently ‘transparent 
text’ (de Certeau, 1984: 93). However, the sense of unity is a ‘fiction’, a ‘semblance’, which many 
activists felt contributed towards, rather than resisted, the administration of autonomous protest 
by the state. This was particularly so for those activists who perceive the role of radical politics 
to be that of making unnoticed power dynamics visible so that they may enter the terrain of 
contestation (Karppinene, 2007).
Alternative media sites such as Indymedia have attempted, with varying degrees of success, 
to maintain solidarity across the boundaries that have been used by the mainstream to distinguish 
‘good’ protesters from ‘bad’ protesters (Ruiz 2014). However, the distinction drawn by Sukey 
ignores the possibility of solidarity between differently orientated protest clusters and is therefore 
entirely in keeping with more mainstream representations of activists. This was a view that was 
quickly taken up and articulated within the wider activist community, which accused Sukey of 
‘buying into the mass media and the government’s line on what kind of protest is acceptable’ 
(Steve, 2011). 
At the core of the debate between the newly politicised students at Sukey and activists whose 
politics have been shaped by more autonomous traditions is a series of questions about the role 
of conflict within political protest. Sukey is firmly rooted in a liberal tradition that works towards 
the eradication of the boundaries between different social actors such as police and protesters. 
However, Sukey’s desire to reduce ‘the need for kettling’ (http://www.openSukey.org) is deeply 
problematic for activists who consider that ‘mass violence against the police is a necessary part 
of any social struggle’ (http://thecommune.co). Thus, whilst Sukey adopts a very Habermasian 
position in which conflict is seen as evidence of a failure of the political system, many members 
of the wider activist community see conflict as a necessary and potentially productive element in 
the creation of social and political change (Mouffe, 2005).   
As discussed at the start of this article, protest organisations have traditionally used mass 
demonstrations to show the strength of their commitment and recruit fresh supporters. Rising 
levels of civil unrest combined with diminishing levels of public funding mean that the role played 
by conflict during such public demonstrations is increasingly crucial. The arrival of politically 
marginal groups into shared public space upsets the pre-existing social order. Protesters attending 
mass demonstrations arrive in the city seeking permanent change. They want their views, which 
have been defined by the status quo as marginal, to become mainstream. This transition from 
the edge to the centre is uncertain and contingent. However, as this case study demonstrates, 
the mainstreaming of protest introduces a new set of dynamics that more established activist 
communities are still attempting to comprehend. 
Sukey offers protesters a solar eye view of autonomous demonstrations as they unfold 
upon the ground. It is designed to enable ‘normal people’ (http://www.openSukey.org) to avoid 
being kettled by the police. However, it uses new communications technologies to ease friction 
between protesters and police in a way which activists from an autonomous tradition perceive as 
problematic. This is because, in collapsing the boundary between protesters and police, it creates 
a new (and far more familiar) boundary between activists and protesters, normals and crazies, 
the mainstream and the margins. Consequently, the disengaged or distanced view offered by 
Sukey’s solar eye could be seen as contributing to, rather than resisting, the administration of 
autonomous protest. 
If protesters are criminals rather than citizens, bad rather than good, then any action against 
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them becomes an action taken in the public interest. In this article I have examined the ways 
in which different ways of experiencing the city and different ways of using new information 
technologies contribute to the formation of us/them dynamics. In doing so, I have explored 
the practices of kettling and the practice of maptivism in order to reflect upon Sukey’s ability to 
resist the totalising administrations of the state. However, I have found that Sukey’s articulation 
of us/then distinctions confirms, rather than challenges, mainstream understanding of protest 
and contributes to a dynamic in which the de-legitimisation of protesters justifies the use of state 
force. 
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